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The traditional goal of competition law is to regulate markets to ensure that the 
conditions for free and/or fair competition are promoted. From a traditional economic 
point of view, the purpose of competition law and regulation is to place constraints on 
certain forms of commercial conduct in order to promote competition in markets. 
Promoting competition is seen as essential for attaining economic efficiencies, leading 
to innovation and growth in markets.1 In turn, the stated purposes of the South African 
Competition Act2 include, inter alia, promoting the efficiency, adaptability and 
development of the economy,3 providing consumers with competitive prices and 
product choices,4 advancing the social and economic welfare of South Africans,5 and 
ensuring that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy.6 It would therefore appear from these goals that South 
African competition law has a distinctly socio-economic emphasis. Alongside with 
ensuring free and fair competition, the promotion of consumer welfare and welfare in 
general is also of paramount importance.7 These objectives therefore accord with 
those in most other notable competition law jurisdictions.  
Whereas consumer protection is neither a direct objective of competition law 
nor data protection law in South Africa, arguably both bodies of law seek to promote 
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the interests of consumers. With regard to competition law, this is done by promoting 
consumer welfare and fair competition. In terms of data protection law this is 
evidenced by, inter alia, provisions guarding against the misuse of personal 
information and regulating direct marketing. As such, it is submitted that the regulation 
of competition and data protection in South Africa converge on the topic of consumer 
protection. In order to show the extent of convergence, and specifically where any 
tangents and tensions may lie, a brief overview of competition law and enforcement 
as well as data protection will be given. Specific examples of anti-competitive conduct 
relating to the processing of personal information will also be discussed. It is clear that 
the lens through which the Competition Commission views such conduct differs from 
that of the Information Regulator8 and that the diverging approaches lead to disparate 
results. This forms the backdrop to a discussion on the desirability and scope of 
possible future cooperation between authorities in South African regulating 
competition and data protection. 
 
Competition Regulation in South Africa 
Unless a specific form of activity has been excluded from the Act, or the regulation of 
competition matters is provided for in terms of another piece of legislation, all matters 
of competition law must be dealt with in terms of the South African Competition Act. 
Section 3(1) of the Competition Act provides that the Act ‘applies to all economic 
activity within, or having an effect within, the Republic’ with the exception of some 
activities.9 Both the phrases ‘economic activity’ and ‘having an effect within’ have been 
broadly interpreted by courts in South Africa.10 As such, South African Competition 
Law has quite a broad jurisdictional remit. While it is not unusual for competition laws 
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in a variety of countries to have a similar potential reach, their extraterritorial 
application is often reined in through legislation or principles derived from case law.11  
Broadly speaking, the duties of competition authorities can be divided into three 
categories. The first duty relates to regulation of anti-competitive conduct by a firm or 
groups of firms,12 the second the evaluation of mergers between firms,13 and the final 
is the conducting of market inquiries.14 It is submitted that competition and data privacy 
law most likely intersects in relation to both the regulation of anti-competitive conduct 
and market inquiries.  
 
Regulation of anti-competitive conduct 
With regard to the regulation of anti-competitive conduct, the Competition Act 
regulates horizontal restrictive practices, vertical restrictive practices, and abuses of a 
dominant position. Horizontal restrictive practices refer to practices and agreements 
between supposedly competing firms who then collude in order to prevent or lessen 
competition in a market for particular goods and services. Acts which are specifically 
prohibited include price fixing,15 the division and allocation of markets,16 and collusive 
tendering,17 although any conduct that has a nett anti-competitive effect can be 
regulated.18 Vertical restrictive practices commonly include agreements between 
suppliers and distributors purporting to regulate exclusive distribution, exclusive 
dealing or attempts to tie unrelated products together. The only act specifically 
prohibited is any practice seeking to restrict competition on minimum resale prices of 
products.19 Abuse of dominance refers to the conduct of single firm with a dominant 
market position which is sufficiently powerful that they are able to distort competition 
on their own.20 The South African Competition Act regulates price discrimination,21 
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excessive pricing,22 the refusal of access to essential facilities23 and a variety of 
exclusionary acts (both specifically and in general).24 
In order to regulate the above forms of conduct effectively, Chapter 5, Part B of 
the Competition Act provides the Competition Commission with a broad range of 
investigatory powers, including the authority to enter and search premises with or 
without a warrant. Section 58 further provides for remedies that can be imposed on 
firms infringing the act, including interdicts,25 orders of divestiture,26 declaratory orders 
that conduct has infringed the act,27 and the imposition of administrative penalties.28 
Whereas these powers and remedies may at times be seen as excessive, it is not 
uncommon amongst competition authorities world-wide, though it has led to some 
debate as to the nature of competition law enforcement and whether it should be seen 
as criminal or civil in nature.29 
 
Market Inquiries 
The Competition Act allows for the Commission to conduct a formal inquiry into a 
particular market in order to assess the general state of competition therein.30 This 
may be done on its own initiative, or in response to a request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, provided that there is reason to believe that features of the market may 
be affecting competition therein, or that the inquiry is necessary to achieve the 
purposes of the act.31 Prior to an inquiry, a notice setting out its scope and expected 
time of completion must be published,32 and a report must be completed and published 
subsequent to the inquiry.33 The report may include recommendations for new or 
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amended policy, legislation or regulation, as well as recommendations to other 
regulatory authorities in respect of competition matters.34 The inquiry may also lead to 
further steps being taken, including the initiation and/or referral of complaints against 
firms found to have engaged in anticompetitive behaviour.35 The conditions required 
for the initiation of an inquiry are quite broad. Accordingly, inquiries could be conducted 
in newer markets under the auspices of achieving the purposes of the act and the 
Commission could probably justify such an investigation into markets for the 
processing of personal information with relative ease. 
 
Data protection in South Africa 
South Africa has adopted a nuanced approach to data protection. Privacy is protected 
in terms of section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.36 The 
preamble to the Protection of Personal Information Act37 notes that unnecessary 
impediments to the free flow of information should be addressed consonant with the 
constitutional values of democracy and openness, and the need for economic and 
social progress within the framework of the information society.  
The express imperatives for digital inclusion and the need to grow the digital 
economy are limited. Instead, the purpose of POPIA is to give effect to the 
constitutional right to privacy. This is sought to be accomplished by safeguarding 
personal information when processed by a responsible party, subject to justifiable 
limitations that are aimed at  
“(i) balancing the right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right of access to 
information;38 and 
(ii) protecting important interests, including the free flow of information within the Republic 
and across international borders”.39 
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The scope and interpretation of POPIA 
POPIA has a wide scope of application. It applies to the personal information of 
identifiable, living natural persons and identifiable existing juristic persons.40 Natural 
persons and companies are data subjects. The definition of a responsible party 
includes a public or private body.41 POPIA thus regulates the processing of personal 
information of natural persons and companies or other incorporates. It also applies to 
the processing of personal information by the administration in the national, provincial 
or local governmental spheres. POPIA also applies to the processing of personal 
information by other regulators.    
POPIA regulates the manner in which personal information may be processed 
by establishing conditions that prescribe the minimum threshold requirements for the 
lawful processing of personal information.42 It provides rights and remedies to data 
subjects if their personal information is processed unlawfully43 and establishes 
voluntary and compulsory measures to promote respect for and the enforcement of  
the rights protected by POPIA.44 POPIA applies to the processing of personal 
information where the responsible party is domiciled in the Republic, or  makes  use  
of  automated  or non-automated means in the Republic, unless those means are used 
only to forward personal information through the Republic.45 
POPIA establishes the principle that whatever legislative provision provides the 
most protection to data subjects will prevail. Where any provision of any other 
legislation that regulates the processing of personal information is materially 
inconsistent with an object or a specific provision POPIA, POPIA will apply to the 
exclusion of that provision.46 However, if any other legislation provides for conditions 
for the lawful processing of personal information that are more extensive than those 
set out in Chapter 3 of POPIA, then the extensive conditions provided for in that 
legislation prevail.47  
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POPIA must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to its purpose set out in 
section 2.48 Furthermore, POPIA should be interpreted to facilitate, rather than inhibit, 
the exercising or performing of powers, duties and functions of public and private 
bodies that relate to the processing of personal information.  
  
The Information Regulator 
The Regulator is an independent body established in terms of section 39 of POPIA. It 
is subject only to the law and the Constitution and it is accountable to the National 
Assembly. The Regulator has a dual constitutional mandate framed by the rights of 
privacy49 and access to information.50 Accordingly, it is empowered to monitor and 
enforce compliance by public and private bodies in line with the provisions of PAIA 
and POPIA. 
POPIA lists certain activities which are considered to be an interference with 
the protection of personal information of a data subject. The list of activities is relatively 
expansive, and accordingly only those interferences that are relevant to the regulation 
of anti-competitive conduct are outlined below. An aggrieved person may lodge a 
complaint with the Regulator in connection with a breach of the conditions for the lawful 
processing of personal information.51  
It should be noted that POPIA is not yet fully in operation and only certain 
sections of POPIA have been proclaimed. The remaining sections of POPIA will 
commence once the office of the Regulator is fully operational.  Notwithstanding this, 
the comments on the application of POPIA in relation to anticompetitive uses for and 
of personal information are not affected by this fact.  
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Conditions for the lawful processing of personal information  
POPIA prescribes eight conditions for the lawful processing of personal information. 
These conditions are cumulative, apply horizontally, and broadly accord with the 
principles found in the General Data Protection Regulation.52 Only some of the 
conditions that may be relevant to the anti-competitive uses for and of personal 
information are discussed here.  
The processing limitation provides that data subjects’ consent is required for 
the processing of their personal information. Consent requires a voluntary, specific, 
and informed expression of will in terms of which permission is given for the processing 
of personal information. POPIA also provides that personal information must be 
collected directly from data subjects except where compliance would prejudice a lawful 
purpose of the collection or is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of the 
particular case.53 The purpose specification requires personal information to be 
collected for a specific and lawful purpose related to a function or activity of the 
responsible party.54 The further processing limitation provides that any further 
processing must be compatible with the original purpose for which the personal 
information was collected.55 Data subjects must be notified of the collection of their 
personal information in accordance with the openness condition. The condition that 
relates to information quality requires a responsible party to take reasonably 
practicable steps to ensure that the personal information it is processing is complete, 
accurate, not misleading and updated where necessary. Lastly, section 70 of POPIA 
prohibits automated decision making which is based on the automated processing of 
a data subject’s personal information through which, for example, a person’s personal 
preferences or conduct are outlined. 
 
Anti-competitive uses for and of personal information 
Recent data breaches and investigations (such as those revolving around Cambridge 
Analytica, for example) have made it abundantly clear that the abusive use of data can 
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have massive potential implications for society, and that there is a lack of 
understanding surrounding the practice and impact of data analytics.56 While most of 
these have shown how data misuse could potentially affect a political landscape, 
personal information can be used (or is being used) in a similar manner by commercial 
operators through automated decision making.  
Notable examples of the anti-competitive uses for and of personal information 
are broadly discussed below. It is foreseen that an operator could share data between 
itself and third parties which also happen to be its competitors (or affiliated to its 
competitors), and such information could then be used to facilitate a variety of collusive 
practices. It is also not uncommon for the privacy policies of companies to allow for 
processing of personal information for ‘business purposes,’ a sufficiently broad term 
which could include the sharing of data.57 When this is done, it would be particularly 
difficult to show that customers within a market are being allocated between 
competitors on the basis of a particular information profile.  
 The sharing of personal information will not necessarily contravene the 
Competition Act. Firstly, information sharing between competitors would be allowed 
under several circumstances, for example when establishing joint ventures or to 
coordinate efforts to allow for greater competition in export markets.58 Secondly, 
analysis of its potential anti-competitive effects can often be quite complex59 and the 
sharing of personal information may not directly be linked to the anti-competitive 
outcomes. However, from a POPIA point of view the sharing of personal information 
of data subjects between third parties may breach a number of the conditions for the 
lawful processing of personal information, including the processing limitation 
(consent), the purpose specification, the further processing limitation and openness. 
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Such conduct may also amount to automated decision prohibited in terms of section 
71 of POPIA.   
Aside from the facilitation of collusive practices, information could similarly be 
used to engage in targeted “misinformation campaigns” to dissuade consumers from 
dealing with particular businesses. In the hands of a dominant firm, data analytics 
could easily be used to facilitate price discrimination, not to mention the charging of 
excessive prices or predatory pricing strategies. A dominant firm could also possibly 
use such tactics as a means of inducing customers not to deal with potential 
competitors in a similar manner to how colluding firms could use targeted 
misinformation. From a competition law point of view, there is a grey area between 
what would be considered clever marketing strategies and what constitutes conduct 
amounting to the inducement of customers not to deal with a particular company.60 
However, if viewed from a data protection point of view the Regulator will be able to 
play a meaningful role in curbing such collusive practices. The use of targeted 
misinformation will likely involve the processing of personal information of or in relation 
to competing firms. In such instances the processing will involve a breach of the 
conditions for the lawful processing of personal information including the processing 
limitation (consent), the purpose specification, the further processing limitation; 
openness and information quality. The fact that the personal information of juristic 
persons is protected widens the mandate of the Regulator considerably. As a result, 
the compliance obligations of all responsible parties may have a sobering impact on 
information-rich collusive practices in South Africa.  
There is currently some debate as to whether data platforms in the hands of 
dominant firms may be seen as an essential facility which actual or potential 
competitors should be granted access to.61 Whereas this is a complex, nuanced issue 
in other jurisdictions, it is submitted that the definition of what constitutes an “essential 
facility” in the South African context requires that the infrastructure or resource cannot 
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reasonably be duplicated, and without access a firm would not reasonably be able to 
provide goods or services.62 Merely frustrating competitive efforts or arguing that there 
are high costs involved in duplicating the resources or in coming up with an alternative 
solution will not suffice.63 Whereas it is possible that this issue might be raised in South 
Africa at some point in the future, it is submitted that it is unlikely to be a problem in 
practice given the current context. If viewed from a data protection perspective, the 
conditions for the lawful processing of personal information may form a bar against 
access by actual or potential competitors. Such conditions include the processing 
limitation (consent and the collection of personal information directly from the data 
subject). Access may also breach other conditions for the lawful processing of 
personal information, such as the purpose specification, the further processing 
limitation and openness. 
 As noted above, the Competition Act seeks to promote the development of the 
economy and consumer choices as far as competitive prices and product choices are 
concerned. POPIA, in turn, seeks to protect the rights of data subjects (and in this 
case competitors) as regards the processing of their personal information. Given this, 
it is submitted that there are clear overlaps between the objectives of competition law 
and that of data protection law. The Regulator and the Competition Commission could 
address these issues through greater cooperation. Accordingly, the extent to which 
this is possible must be assessed. 
 
Scope for cooperation between the Competition Commission and Information 
Regulator? 
If the Regulator considers that a complaint relates (either wholly or partially) to a matter 
that is regulated in terms of another law, it must first consult with the relevant regulatory 
authority in order to determine if the complaint should be dealt with in terms of 
POPIA.64 If it is subsequently determined that the complaint should be dealt with by 
another body, the Regulator must refer the matter.65 As such, any matters where 
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competition law considerations arise should be brought under the attention of the 
Competition Commission and would subsequently likely be dealt with by it.  
While it may be argued that the Competition Commission is likely to be the best 
body to deal with matters of competition law, they do not necessarily possess 
adequate knowledge or understanding of the processes and principles of data 
protection either in general or how it specifically applies in the South African context. 
One of the express functions of the Competition Commission is to negotiate 
agreements with any regulatory authority to coordinate and harmonise the exercise of 
jurisdiction over competition matters within a relevant industry or sector, and to ensure 
the consistent application of the principles of the Competition Act.66 If there is 
concurrent jurisdiction between two authorities, a cooperation agreement must be 
entered into.67 Additionally, any organ of state must assist the Commission in the 
carrying out of its duties or powers.68  
Whereas there is clearly no concurrent jurisdiction between the Competition 
Commission and the Regulator, there exists a duty on the Regulator to co-operate with 
the Commission regarding the referral of complaints. It is submitted that a cooperation 
agreement between the two bodies would be advisable as the unlawful processing of 
personal information can have anti-competitive effects apart from the interference with 
the protection of personal information of data subjects. It is likely that a great number 
of issues will arise in future falling within the legislative mandate of both the Regulator 
and the Competition Commission. Such agreements are also not uncommon, given 
that several already exist between the Commission and other organs of state where 




                                                             
66 Section 21(1)(h) of the Competition Act 
67 Section 82(1) of the Competition Act read along with Section 3(1A) 
68 Section 20(3) of the Competition Act 
69 Examples of agreements currently in place where there is no concurrent jurisdiction include ones with the 
International Trade and Administration Commission of South Africa, the South African Bureau of Standards, 
and various ministerial departments.  
Concluding Remarks 
On 1 December 2017, a draft competition amendment bill was published for public 
commentary. Shortly thereafter, on 11 July 2018, the Competition Amendment Bill70 
was tabled in the South African National Assembly. Among other things, the Bill 
proposes to provide competition authorities with broader powers in relation to market 
inquiries and it expands the list of expressly prohibited conduct amounting to the abuse 
of dominance. Most pertinently, the Bill mandates that the Competition Commission 
must publish guidelines in relation to various forms of anti-competitive conduct71 and 
clarifies the process of consultation in relation to such guidelines.72 Furthermore, the 
Bill expands the ambit of issues that other regulatory authorities must cooperate with 
the Competition Commission on, including express references to market inquires.73 
Whereas the Bill has been criticised for being harsh to business at times,74 it shows 
an attempt to align competition law and processes with related public policies. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this contribution, it does serve to bolster the argument 
that there is sound rationale for the Competition Commission and Regulator to enter 
into a cooperation agreement in the not too distant future.   
It is submitted that the substantive content and extent of any cooperation 
agreement between the Competition Commission and the Regulator should not seek 
to create an unnecessary additional layer of competition regulation for responsible 
parties (data processors). For instance, competition authorities could be consulted by 
the Regulator when developing codes of conduct to ensure that anti-competitive 
effects are not unduly or inadvertently facilitated. However, the mere fact that data 
processing and the transfer of personal information may have an effect on competition 
does not mean that the Commission should investigate or regulate the industry more 
fastidiously than it does any other industry or product. The focus should not be on the 
content of the service or the market itself - except, naturally, when a market inquiry is 
being conducted. Rather, the focus must be on the conduct of individual responsible 
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parties and an analysis of its anti-competitive effects accordingly. Adopting such an 
approach would be comparable to the position that has evolved over time in relation 
to the convergence between competition and intellectual property law.75  
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